fileformer
search⌘KtranslateENexpand_moreupload_fileConvert
Converters8 file families · 44 direct conversions
What changes in a conversionarrow_forward
home/general-tools/password-generator

Password Generator & Hash Tool - MD5, SHA, bcrypt

Password generator

Strong, random passwords and memorable passphrases, generated on your device. We never see, store or send them.

passwordRandomformat_quotePassphrasedialpadPIN
7h#dr@VW?R*Z$XtWwI
refreshcontent_copyCopy
verified_userVery strong
entropy112 bits
time to cracklonger than the universe
length18 chars
Length18
864
infoPINs use digits only, so each extra digit matters. Use at least 6 digits, avoid dates and patterns like 123456, and let the device lock after a few wrong tries.
UppercaseA: ZNumbers0-9Symbols!@#$%Avoid look-alikesno 0 O l 1 I
More options, one clickrefreshNew batch
bZx0ahyXErIb38I+SAcontent_copyM@9Aw5w?TEg@%m5iNtcontent_copya^^61wIi^SBrrrTAKvcontent_copyb-$O?Afv*fg=t8p6Vtcontent_copyu0+0N@N^qCCwZ5^*pAcontent_copy
~/what-makes-it-strong

Length beats cleverness.

Attackers guess billions of passwords per second. What stops them is the number of possible combinations, and every extra character multiplies it.

passwordtime to crack (offline attack)verdict
password1common word + digitinstantlyavoid
Tr0ub4dor&311 chars, “clever” swaps~3 daysweak
K7$mQ2!vXp10 random characters~2 yearsfair
amber-otter-lotus-quill4 random words~50k yearsstrong
x9#Lq!2vR@m8Tz$wKp4&20 random charactersforeververy strong
Illustrative, assuming 10 billion guesses per second against a fast hash. Real attacks vary.
keyOne password per siteWhen one site is breached, reused passwords unlock every other account. A password manager makes unique ones painless.
format_quotePassphrases are easier to typeFour or five random words are as strong as a long random string, and far easier to enter on a phone.
phonelink_lockTurn on two-factorEven a perfect password can be phished. A second factor stops most account takeovers.
~/how-passwords-get-cracked

Four ways attackers get in.

Knowing how passwords are actually broken shows which advice matters. Pick an attack to see how it works and what stops it.

menu_bookDictionary attacktries common words firstgrid_4x4Brute forcetries every combinationsync_problemCredential stuffingreuses leaked passwordsphishingPhishingtricks you into typing it
menu_bookDictionary attack

Attackers start with lists of real leaked passwords and dictionary words, plus predictable tweaks: capital first letter, 1 or ! at the end, a → @, o → 0.

$ try password$ try Password1$ try P@ssw0rd!✓ match after 2,114 guesses
beatsReal words, names, dates and “clever” letter swaps.
stopped byRandomness. A generated password isn’t in any list.
~/how-crackers-see-it

Type a password and see it the way a cracker does.

Most strength meters count character types: “Summer2026!” has capitals, digits and a symbol, so it looks strong. Crackers don't guess characters, they guess patterns: a common word, then a year, then an exclamation mark. This analysis runs on your device, splits your password into the patterns a cracker would try and estimates the guesses each takes. Nothing is sent unless you press the breach check, and even then only the first 5 characters of a hash leave your device.

Summer2026!P@ssw0rdTr0ub4dor&3qwerty123correct horse battery stapleaaaaaa1x9#Lq!2vR@m8Tz$w
Summercommon password48 guesses2026year200 guesses!random characters33 guesses
character-count meter says72 bits11 characters from a pool of 95: looks like 4 thousand years against a fast hash.
pattern-aware estimate21 bitsAbout ≈ 2^20.9 guesses: 51 bits weaker than the meter claims, because the parts are predictable.
attackguesses / sto find it, on average
Online, rate-limitedthe site locks out after a few tries0.0281 year
Online, no limita careless API1 k16 minutes
Offline, fast hasha leaked SHA-256 database22 Gunder a second
Offline, slow hasha leaked bcrypt database, cost 105.8 k3 minutes
breach check, k-anonymitySHA-1 F1DF71A9D60CD46A2E09691E504C4E09A4DA9A7AOnly the 5 highlighted characters are sent. The service returns every leaked hash starting with them, about 800 on average, and the match happens here.travel_exploreCheck against Have I Been Pwned

The estimator is a simplified version of the approach used by Dropbox's zxcvbn. It knows about 30 of the most common leaked passwords, this page's 100-word list, letter-for-number swaps, keyboard runs, repeats and years. Real cracking dictionaries hold billions of entries, so treat a high score as an upper bound.

~/fair-dice

A secure random source can still give unfair passwords.

Random bytes run from 0 to 255. Picking a character with byte % alphabetSize looks harmless, but unless 256 divides evenly, the first few characters come up more often. Your browser just drew 262,144 real random bytes from crypto.getRandomValues and mapped them both ways. This page uses the second way, rejection sampling: bytes that would cause bias are thrown away and redrawn.

alphabet10 digits26 letters62 alphanumeric94 printablecasinoDraw again
Naive: byte % 62random[i] % 62
chi-squared1683pass limit, 99.9%95most ÷ least1.32×
The first 8 characters (red) each get 5 of the 256 byte values, the rest only 4, so they come up 25% more often. Each character is worth 5.950 bits instead of 5.954.
Rejection samplingredraw if random[i] ≥ 248
chi-squared82pass limit, 99.9%95most ÷ least1.08×
Bytes 248 to 255 are thrown away and redrawn, so every character gets exactly 4 byte values. 8,145 bytes (3.1%) were discarded. The generator above works this way.
A chi-squared value above the limit means the counts are too uneven to be chance. At 25% bias an attacker who knows the generator can try the favoured characters first. For a 16-character password that saves 0.07 bits, so the bias is a real flaw, though rarely a fatal one.
~/how-sites-store-it

“Time to crack” depends on the site, not just the password.

When a site is breached, attackers get password hashes, not passwords. How fast they can test guesses depends entirely on which hash the site chose. Below, your device runs real PBKDF2-SHA256 through Web Crypto to show what a deliberately slow hash costs. It then shows how long the password in the generator at the top would last against each common hash.

measured on this devicePBKDF2-SHA256 iterations per second…one login check at 600,000 iterations…guesses per second, this device…timerMeasure againRunning 3 × 50,000 iterations…
The generator's password, 112 bits1 GPU1,000 GPUs1 million GPUs
stored withguesses / saverage time to crack
NTLMWindows account hashes290 G/s10^14 years
MD5unsalted, still common in old sites160 G/s10^14 years
SHA-1the LinkedIn 2012 leak50 G/s10^15 years
SHA-256one pass, fast by design22 G/s10^15 years
PBKDF2-SHA256 × 600,000OWASP 2023 minimum15 k/s10^21 years
bcrypt, cost 10the classic default5.8 k/s10^22 years
Argon2id, 19 MiB, t=2OWASP first choice2 k/s10^22 years
scrypt, N=2^17memory-hard900/s10^22 years
Rates start from approximate figures for one current high-end GPU, based on published hashcat benchmarks, and scale with the GPU count you pick. They're accurate to an order of magnitude at best. Only the PBKDF2 row on the left is measured here.
~/which-type

Random, passphrase or PIN?

All three can be secure. The right one depends on whether you'll ever have to type or remember it.

passwordRandom
x9#Lq!2vR@m8Tz$w
Strength
Easy to remember
Easy to type on phone
Accepted everywhere
Best for:accounts saved in a password manager.Generate onenorth_east
format_quotePassphrase
Amber-Otter-Lotus-Quill42
Strength
Easy to remember
Easy to type on phone
Accepted everywhere
Best for:your manager’s master password, device logins and Wi-Fi.Generate onenorth_east
dialpadPIN
739 204
Strength
Easy to remember
Easy to type on phone
Accepted everywhere
Best for:phones, cards and devices that lock after a few wrong tries.Generate onenorth_east
~/after-you-generate

Got a strong password. Now what?

01Save it in a managerBitwarden, 1Password, Apple Passwords or your browser’s manager, so you never need to remember it.
02Change reused onesStart with email and banking: whoever controls your email can reset everything else.
03Turn on two-factorAn authenticator app or passkey stops most account takeovers, even after a leak.
04Check for leaksServices like Have I Been Pwned tell you when an address appears in a known breach.
lockGenerated on your device, never sentPasswords are created with your browser's secure random source. Nothing is logged, stored or transmitted: close the tab and it's gone.How processing works →
~/reference

What the standards actually say.

Much familiar password advice, such as forced symbols or changing every 90 days, has been dropped by NIST. These are the current rules for sites, and the settings OWASP recommends for storing passwords.

ruleNIST SP 800-63Bstrength
Minimum length15 characters when the password is the only factor, 8 when it’s used with another factor.shall
Maximum lengthAllow at least 64 characters.should
Allowed charactersAll printing ASCII, the space, and Unicode. Normalise Unicode before hashing.should
Composition rulesDon’t require mixtures of character types, such as “at least one symbol”.shall not
Periodic changesDon’t force changes on a schedule. Force a change only when there’s evidence of compromise.shall not
BlocklistCompare new passwords against known breached, common and context-specific values.shall
Hints and questionsNo password hints, and no knowledge-based security questions.shall not
Paste and managersAllow pasting and password managers. Offer to show the password while typing.should

Storing passwords: OWASP minimum settings

first choiceArgon2idm=19456 (19 MiB), t=2, p=1Memory-hard, so GPUs and custom chips gain far less. Winner of the 2015 Password Hashing Competition.
if Argon2id is unavailablescryptN=2^17 (128 MiB), r=8, p=1Also memory-hard. Widely available in standard libraries.
legacy systemsbcryptcost 10 or moreOnly the first 72 bytes of the password count. Pre-hash longer inputs carefully.
FIPS-140 compliancePBKDF2HMAC-SHA-256, 600,000 iterationsNot memory-hard, so GPUs run it fast. Use it only where compliance requires it.

Bits per unit, by alphabet

3.32digitA PIN digit, 0-9
4.70lowercase lettera: z
5.95letter or digitA: Z, a, z, 0-9
6.55printable ASCIIall 95 keyboard characters
6.64word, this pageone of the 100 words used here
12.92word, EFF listone of 7,776 words, five dice rolls

From crypt() to passkeys

1976Unix crypt()Passwords hashed with a modified DES, salted with 12 bits.
1979Morris and ThompsonTheir paper shows how weak user-chosen Unix passwords are, and introduces salting.
1999bcryptProvos and Mazières design an adjustable-cost hash for OpenBSD.
2009scryptColin Percival’s memory-hard function makes custom cracking hardware expensive.
2012LinkedIn breachAbout 6.5 million unsalted SHA-1 hashes leak; years later, 117 million more surface.
2015Argon2Wins the Password Hashing Competition.
2017NIST 800-63BDrops composition rules and forced periodic changes.
2022PasskeysApple, Google and Microsoft commit to FIDO passkeys, which can’t be phished or reused.